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ABSTRACT 
Title: How do dismissal laws affect firm profitability? 
Author: Miguel Yum Gama 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study whether and to what extent dismissal laws 
affect firm profitability. To achieve this goal, a within-country analysis was conducted 
into U.S. firms that were affected by the passage of the federal Worker Adjustment 
and Retraining Notification Act of 1989 (the WARN Act) in the years between 1980 and 
2000. The results show that the introduction of such dismissal law had a positive and 
statistically significant impact on firm profitability. Furthermore, this effect was 
particularly pronounced for those firms that invested in R&D expenditure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many factors determine a company's profitability. Strategy literature has usually 
focused on factors endogenous to the firm, such as, for instance, firm decision to 
innovate (Cefis and Ciccarelli, 2005). However, firm profits also strongly depend on 
factors exogenous to the firm, such as the firm's sector (Nagy, 2009), including the 
degree of industry competition (Allen et al., 2011), and the legal system (Pe'er and 
Gottschalg, 2011). 
As a matter of fact, according to the McKinsey Global Survey (2009), governments are 
one of the most important stakeholders of a company: government policies are more 
likely to affect firm profitability than actions by any other stakeholder, with the 
exception of customers1. Furthermore, among the different activities that 
governments perform, passing laws and enforcing regulations have likely the greatest 
effects on business management. 
Previous literature has shown that many laws and regulation likely affect companies’ 
strategies and performance. For example, Garmaise (2011) finds evidence that tougher 
non-competition enforcement not only promotes executive stability, but also reduces 
research and development (R&D) spending and capital expenditures per employee. 
Atanassov (2009), in his research on U.S. states, finds a decline in innovation for firms 
incorporated in states that pass antitakeover laws relative to firms incorporated in 
states that do not. The impact of dismissal laws on company profitability has not yet 
been investigated though. This study intends to fill this gap. 
Dismissal laws regulate the extent to which employers can easily terminate labor 
contracts with employees, and constitute a branch of labor laws. Whether the effect of 
dismissal laws on company profitability is positive or negative is not clear ex-ante. 
On the one hand, they may have a negative impact on profitability as they increase 
costs. Essentially, the stricter dismissal laws are, the harder it becomes for employers 
                                                          
1
 Results comprised responses from 1,167 executives representing the full range of industries, regions, 
and functional specialties. 
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to fire employees such that companies have to keep workers who otherwise would 
have been laid off (Botero et al., 2004). The wages that are paid to these workers thus 
constitute extra expenses. 
Moreover, reducing the employers' possibility to terminate the employment contract 
at-will, can lead to ex-post inefficient outcomes. Employees will feel less pressure to be 
efficient if there is a decrease in the risk of losing their jobs (Autor, Kerr and Kugler, 
2007). For this reason, Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn (2009) argue that mandatory 
dismissal regulations have a depressing impact on productivity growth in industries 
where layoff restrictions are more likely to be binding. Overall, these studies suggest 
that stricter dismissal laws reduce employee efficiency and increase costs, which 
should have a predictable negative effect on firm profitability. 
On the other hand, dismissal laws may increase profitability by making firms more 
innovative (Acharya, Baghai and Subramanian, 2012a, 2012b). Innovation is bound to 
experimentation, trial and error, and very often, many failures occur before success. As 
such, the optimal incentive for innovation exhibit a high degree of tolerance for early 
failure and reward long-term results (Ederer and Manso, 2010; Manso, 2011). 
However, the pressure faced by companies may lead to the premature dismissal of 
corporate inventors because their projects do not show any short-term results. By 
increasing the hurdles for terminating contracts, dismissal laws may enhance 
employees' innovative efforts, by providing them with the possibility to fail without the 
fear of being dismissed (Acharya et al., 2012a, 2012b). 
The goal of this research is to assess how dismissal laws impact firm profitability, 
through the two routes of increased innovation, on one side, and costs, on the other 
side. Ultimately, this study aims at understanding which route prevails. 
In order to accomplish this task, I executed a difference-in-difference analysis using the 
data collected from Compustat database from 1980 to 1990. Following the strategy of 
Acharya et al. (2012a), I exploit the discontinuity created by the 1989 Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act), which represented an 
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increase in dismissal law strictness. The main objective was to assess its effect on the 
profitability of U.S. firms, as measured by their return on assets (ROA). 
The empirical analysis provided evidence that the changes in dismissal law had a 
positive impact on company profitability and, furthermore, that this impact was more 
evident in firms with significant R&D investment. In conclusion, the results of this study 
illustrate an additional positive aspect of labor laws on companies' economic 
performance. 
This thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature regarding 
labor laws. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and the data used. Section 4 
reports the results of the empirical analyses. Finally, Section 5 gives a conclusion to the 
work. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Labor dismissal laws 
Dismissal laws exist in every country as a form of employees' protection, as they 
prevent employers from terminating labor contracts with employees at-will. 
Dismissal laws constitute a branch of labor laws. The characteristic of labor laws is 
closely tied to the civil or common law legal origin of the country (La Porta et al., 
1997). Common law has always been supportive of employment relationship 
independence. In other words, the contracting parties are free to contract under 
whatever terms they wish and their agreement is a matter that only concerns them. In 
contrast, the civil approach is less flexible regarding the terms under which employer 
and employee can contract and, consequently, terminate such bonds. 
Consider the following examples: An English Court of Appeal judge commented in 1988 
that a person 'is without question free under the law of contract to carry out certain 
work for another without entering into a contract of service. Public policy has nothing 
to say either way'2. On the other hand, the Federal Labor Court in Germany stated in 
1967 that: 'German labor law is mandatory', such that 'only in borderline cases can 
account be taken of how the parties have labeled a particular contract'3 (Deakin, Lele 
and Siems, 2007). 
Besides the legal origin another important factor that explains labor law strictness is 
the timing in which the major legal innovations of the nineteenth century, with regard 
to industrialization, took place in each country (Deakin et al., 2007). 
For instance, the early industrialization observed in Britain led to the emergence of big 
business companies at a point in which the legal transition from late-medieval or early-
modern forms of regulation were still in progress. One consequence of this scenario 
was the English Government's view of the enterprise as the employer's unencumbered 
property up until almost the end of the nineteenth century (Deakin and Wilkinson, 
                                                          
2
 Ralph Gibson in Calder v. H. Kitson Vickers & Sons (Engineers) Ltd. [1988] ICR 232, 251. 
3
 Crim., 20 octobre 1985, Bull. crim. No. 335. 
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2005). The fact that it was so late also led to the same model being adopted by its 
colonies, namely those in Africa, India, Australia and North America, which we will 
delve into later. In contrast to Britain's situation, by the time most countries in 
Western Europe, like France and Germany, underwent large-scale industrialization, 
private law codes had already been well established for some decades. 
2.2. Dismissal laws in U.S. 
In the case of the U.S., labor regulation was largely influenced by its British heritage. 
Employment law has mostly been based on the common law rule of at-will 
employment, in all U.S. states, according to which employer and/or employee may 
choose to terminate contract without given notice or any stated reason. Figure 1 
shows an illustration of U.S. regulation of dismissal compared with the U.K., Germany, 
France and India. 
Figure 1. Regulation of Dismissal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) The figure shows the strength of the "Regulation of Dismissal" for a given country and year. Higher 
values indicate more employment protection/stricter laws. The dismissal index data is from Deakin et al. 
(2007). 
Source: Deakin et al., 2007 
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The dismissal law index is part of a larger labor law index developed by Deakin et al. 
(2007) and covers five aspects of labor and employment law: the regulation of 
alternative forms of labor contracting to that of the standard full-time, indeterminate 
employment relationship (self-employment, part-time work, fixed-term contracting 
and agency work); the regulation of working time; the regulation of dismissal; the law 
governing employee representation; and the law governing industrial action. It reports 
the laws for five countries – the U.K., U.S., Germany, France and India – for the period 
between 1970 and 2006. Altogether, the index consists of 40 individual variables – 
nine in the "Regulation of Dismissal" category. For the full dataset, with sources and 
explanations for the coding, I refer the reader to Deakin et al. (2007). 
As it is clear from the figure, in the U.S., laws affecting dismissal only started to see 
some significant change in the late 1980s, while in U.K. and France, these laws had 
already been well established since the early 1970s. Nevertheless, the late 
strengthening verified in the index does not mean that no changes occurred in the U.S. 
dismissal regulation until 1989. 
From the 1930s, there have been legislative modifications to the at-will rule. The 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) created a major exception to employers' 
rights to dismiss employees at will by making it unlawful to dismiss an employee for 
union activity. This modification of the common law was upheld by the Supreme Court 
in 1937 in the landmark case, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 
Three decades later, Congress made another inroad into the at-will rule by enacting 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which made it unlawful to dismiss an employee 
or deny employment on the basis of race, sex, national origin or religion. These 
exceptions, while important, were narrow inroads in the doctrine giving employees 
dismissal protection in only a narrow range of circumstance and the at-will 
employment model was still predominant (Stone, 2006). 
However, beginning in the 1970s, the legal consensus supporting this model started to 
erode. In a series of precedent-setting cases between 1972 and 1992, an 
overwhelming majority of U.S. state courts adopted one or more common law 
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exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. Known as "wrongful discharge laws" 
(WDL), these constrained the ability of employers operating in the adopting states to 
dismiss workers, increasing employee protection from unfair dismissal. 
The legal profession distinguishes three distinct WDL: the public-policy exception, the 
good-faith exception, and the implied-contract exception. In a given state, courts 
recognize anywhere from zero to all three of these exceptions. 
The public-policy exception states that an employer cannot discharge an employee for 
declining to violate lawful public policy, taking actions that are in the public's interest, 
or refusing to commit an illegal act. 
The implied-contract exception is applied in situations where the employer implicitly 
indicates that termination shall only occur due to just cause. Legal scholars claim that 
this exception offers limited leverage in reducing employers' ability to unilaterally 
decide the fate of an employment relationship.  
The good-faith exception applies in situations where a court determines that an 
employer discharged an employee for "bad cause." Importantly, unjust dismissal can 
arise even when no implied contract exists between the employer and the employee 
(e.g. even if no indication had been made that the employment contract was long-
term). Many legal scholars deem the good-faith exception to be the most far-reaching 
WDL (Kugler and Saint-Paul, 2004). Due to the applicability of tort law – which entails 
damages to punish the defendant and thereby deter future wrongdoing – the good-
faith exception is a potentially very costly one for employers. Table 1 summarizes each 
one of them. 
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Table 1. Wrongful discharge laws 
WDL DESCRIPTION 
Number of 
adopting states 
by 1999 
The public-policy 
exception 
When the employee refused to violate the law 43 
The implied-contract 
exception 
When the employer implicitly indicated that 
termination would only occur due to just cause 
41 
The good-faith 
exception 
When a court determines that termination 
occurred in "bad cause" 
   13* 
* Since 1970 
Source: Acharya, Baghai and Subramanian, 2012b 
Furthermore, in 1988 the U.S. Congress enacted the federal law known as the WARN 
Act. Constituting one of the major reforms in the U.S. employment market, it 
represents the basis for my analysis. 
The WARN Act is a federal law, which came into force in 1989, that required employers 
to give 60 days' written notice before a mass layoff or plant closure to: (i) affected 
workers; (ii) the chief elected official of the local government where the employment 
site is located; and (iii) the State Rapid Response Dislocated Worker Unit. All private 
employers with 100 or more full-time employees, or with 100 or more employees who 
work at least a combined 4,000 hours a week, are subject to the law. Only layoffs 
classified as "mass layoffs" or "plant closures," or layoffs of 500 or more full-time 
workers at a single site of employment, are covered.4 In the case of non-compliance, 
employees, their representatives, or local government can bring individual or class 
action suits in federal district courts against employers. Any employers who break the 
WARN Act are liable for damages in the form of back pay and benefits to affected 
employees. 
                                                          
4
 A "plant closure" is defined as the closure of a facility within a single employment site involving the 
layoff of at least 50 full-time workers. In the case of a "mass layoff," an employer lays off either between 
50 and 499 full-time workers at a single site of employment, or 33% of the number of full-time workers 
at a single employment site. 
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Both the WDL and the WARN Act represent important dismissal law changes which are 
expected to have an impact on profitability. 
2.3. The impact of dismissal law on company profitability 
Previous literature has analyzed whether dismissal laws are beneficial or detrimental 
to companies. A first group of studies argue that limiting the company's possibility of 
firing employees at-will, has a detrimental effect on company profitability for several 
reasons. 
First, dismissal laws, by making it harder for employers to dismiss employees 
constitute a sort of tax on firing. This implies that firms decide to keep even those 
workers who otherwise, due to their insufficient productivity, would have been laid 
off. In other words, firms retain unproductive workers (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001). 
For the very same reason, dismissal laws also discourage new hiring. Firms will refrain 
from hiring even those workers whose productivity would in principle exceed their 
market wage, without the tax imposed by the dismissal law. The distortions induced by 
dismissal laws may also incentivize firms to substitute labor for capital or technological 
solutions (Autor et al., 2007). 
Second, dismissal laws can reduce workers incentive to exert effort and thus reduce 
employees' productivity. The substantial increase in job security that dismissal laws 
confer to employees makes them feel less pressured about their work, which in turn 
leads them to put less effort in their tasks. This productivity loss has been verified in 
India, where pro-worker labor laws led to lower levels of investment, productivity and 
output (Besley and Burgess, 2004). Also true in OECD countries, mandatory dismissal 
regulations probably had an adverse effect on productivity in industries where layoff 
restrictions are more likely to be binding (Bassanini et al., 2009). 
A second group of studies reached the opposite conclusion and found positive 
outcomes of dismissal law regulation. The findings of Acharya et al., (2012a, 2012b) in 
particular, pointed out the positive impact that stricter dismissal regulation has on 
innovation. 
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Innovation is the result of learning from the exploration of new technologies 
(Jovanovic and Rob, 1990; Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996; Aghion, 2002), and failures are 
sometimes needed to make way for new discoveries. The intolerant nature of some 
employers has adverse consequences to this progress, many times leading to the 
premature dismissal of the inventors when they fail to show short-term results. 
More precisely, past studies on incentives for creativity and innovation have shown 
that the optimal incentive scheme that motivates innovation exhibits substantial 
tolerance for early failure and reward for long-term success. Moreover, inefficient 
continuation may be optimal to induce exploration since the threat of termination may 
prevent innovation pursuers from exploring new untested approaches (Ederer and 
Manso, 2010; Manso, 2011). 
By making it harder to terminate employees' contracts, stricter dismissal laws can 
introduce the tolerance that inventors need from their companies. Confirming this 
argument, Acharya et al. (2012a) verified an increase both in patents and citations in 
U.S. firms following the increase in dismissal strictness that was introduced by the 
WARN Act. 
Supporting these findings, in a different study, they provided empirical evidence that 
WDL can be instrumental in advancing innovation (Acharya et al., 2012b).  
There is also a further reasons explaining why WDL, particularly those that prohibit 
employers from acting in bad faith ex-post, limit employers' ability to hold up 
innovating employees after the innovation is successful. An example of such a hold-up 
situation was the case filed against the video-game company Activision by its former 
employees West and Zampella, which alleged that the company fired these employees 
after they completed a video-game development but before they received any 
royalties for their work.5 
                                                          
5
 For further details about the case, I refer the reader to a news article published at 
http://ve3d.ign.com/articles/news/54192/Activision-Counter-Sues-Fired-Infinity-Ward-Founders-Suit-
Scanned-Broken-Down-Transcribed 
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By reducing the possibility of this kind of hold-up, dismissal laws enhance employees' 
innovative efforts and encourage firms to invest in risky, but potentially mould-
breaking, projects. Based on the previous arguments and findings, we can assume that 
there is a causal relationship between firm-level innovation and the passage of laws 
governing the ease with which firms can dismiss their employees. 
In turn, innovation is likely to increase firms' profitability. A considerable amount of 
empirical literature has considered the link between R&D inputs, innovation and firms' 
profitability. The consensus is overwhelmingly of a positive relationship, alas with 
some debate about the precise nature of the relationship. Geroski, Machin and Van 
Reenen (1993) and Leiponen (2000), for instance, conclude that the profitability effects 
of individual innovations are relatively transitory, and that firms with strong 
investment in R&D are steadily more profitable than those with weak or no investment 
because they have superior internal capabilities. On the other hand, in an analysis of 
the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, Roberts (1999) finds evidence of a conveyor belt of 
new products, each of which provides only a temporary monopoly position, but which 
collectively result in high profits among innovative firms. Despite these differences, all 
studies suggest that innovators are persistently more profitable than non-innovators, 
making the positive effect that innovation has on profitability quite clear. 
Overall, as illustrated in figure 2, the overall effect of dismissal law on profitability is 
ambiguous, as dismissal laws increase costs, on one side, but also increase innovation, 
on the other side. The aim of this work is precisely to assess which effect prevails, if 
any. 
Figure 2. The routes through which dismissal law may affect profitability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Dismissal Law has an unclear effect on profitability. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Data and sample  
In order to study the impact of dismissal laws on company profitability, I have used a 
differences-in-differences technique. Following the strategy of Acharya et al. (2012a), I 
took advantage of the fact that the WARN Act only applies to firms with 100 or more 
employees, allowing me to explore the discontinuity created by its passage. 
For collecting information about companies I mainly relied on the Compustat 
database, which contains data about U.S. public companies (i.e. companies listed in 
the U.S. stock market). In particular, I sourced the following data: R&D expenditure, 
number of employees, total assets and earnings before interest and taxes. Table 2 
provides a short description of all the variables used in the analysis: 
Table 2. Main Variables 
 
I limited the sample period to 1980–2000, in order to identify the effect of the WARN 
Act, which was implemented in 1989, more reliably. I also limited the sample to 
companies with between 50 and 150 employees in order to have more similar 
companies in the comparison. Finally, any observations that had negative R&D 
expenditure or that were related to States outside of the U.S. were also removed from 
VARIABLES DEFINITION 
Profitablity 
Approximation to the firm's return on assets 
[EBIT divided by total assets] 
Post 1989 
Dummy variable coded 1 after the passage of the WARN Act 
[i.e. for the years 1989–2011] 
Size 100 
Dummy variable coded 1 if a firm has 100 employees in a 
given year 
R&D Expenditure (log) Natural log of R&D expenditure 
Num. of Employees (log) Natural log of number of employees 
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the sample. All this led to a total of 3,348 U.S. companies and 11,471 firm-year 
observations. 
3.2. Empirical strategy 
The empirical analysis pertains to the firm level. I estimated the impact that the 
bolstering of dismissal laws had on the firms' overall profitability. Specifically, I 
estimated the following regression model through OLS: 
                                            
where Yit is the return on assets for firm i in year t. t accounts for year fixed effects and 
general macro-economic factors varying over time. Xit represents a set of control 
variables which include the natural log of both R&D expenditure and number of 
employees. β1 measures the effect that the WARN Act had on firms' profitability. If the 
cost effect prevails, β1 is negative. Otherwise, if the innovation effect prevails, its value 
is positive. 
Furthermore, I also analyzed whether the impact of labor dismissal law was different 
for firms that spent more on R&D. To do so, I performed a similar regression, 
interacting the WARN Act with the firms' R&D expenditure. The specification is: 
                                                            
                      
where logxrd is the natural log of R&D expenditure for firm i in year t. If β2 is positive, 
the innovation effect predominantly accentuated for firms that have a high R&D 
expenditure. 
An important issue concerning the use of difference-in-difference analysis is the 
inconsistency in standard errors that can result from serial correlations among 
observations (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004). Subsequently, it can lead to 
false statistical significance in the treatment. Given that my analysis includes several 
periods of time, this effect can be particularly high. Therefore, I have clustered all 
standard errors to the firm level. 
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Another important problem regarding the analysis is endogeneity of the WARN Act. 
A first issue is that the threshold size of the firm (i.e. 100 employees) established by 
the WARN act may be somehow correlated with ROA. I account for this by reducing my 
sample to firms between 50 and 150 employees. In this way, the size difference 
between companies is very small, such that it is probably not crucially important for 
ROA. In this sense, the treated group of firms (i.e. firm with more than 100 but less 
than 150 employees) is substantially similar to the control group (i.e. firms with more 
than 50 employees but less than 100 employees). 
Secondly, firms might endogenously choose the number of employees in order to not 
be affected by WARN. Acharya et al. (2012a) accounts for this by performing a 
separate analysis. The results suggest that it is unlikely that companies changed their 
size in order to avoid being affected by the law. Moreover, due to the relatively short 
period of time taken into account in the analysis (i.e. 1980–2000, and 1985–1995, in 
the robustness checks), firms likely do not have time to react by making strategic 
adjustment to the number of employees, even if they wanted to do so. 
Overall, comparing companies in a relatively short period of time (i.e. between 1980 
and 2000) and close to the threshold (i.e. between 50 and 150 employees) is a way to 
compare similar companies, such that we can assume that for them the treatment is 
exogenous. To further account for this issue, I also conduct a robustness test of the 
main regression in a shorter span of years. 
The empirical analysis previously described was executed using STATA v.12 software. 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics and the pairwise correlations among variables are displayed 
in Tables 3 and 4 below. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Return on assets 11,471 -0.1691 0.5549 -28.7282 0.7377 
(Post1989)*(Size100) 11,471 0.2757 0.4469 0 1 
(Post1989)*(Size100)*(logxrd) 11,471 0.3107 0.7027 0 5.7733 
R&D Expenditure (log) 11,471 0.7970 0.8163 0 5.7733 
Number of Employees (log) 11,471 0.0895 0.0267 0.0488 0.1398 
Post 1989 11,471 0.6873 0.4636 0 1 
Size 100 11,471 0.4017 0.4903 0 1 
 
Table 4. Correlations matrix 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Return on assets 1       
2 (Post1989)*(Size100) 0.0386 1      
3 (Post1989)*(Size100)*(logxrd) -0.0603 0.7167 1     
4 R&D Expenditure (log) -0.2596 0.2494 0.5974 1    
5 Number of Employees (log) 0.1245 0.6533 0.4786 0.1334 1   
6 Post 1989 -0.1188 0.4161 0.2982 0.3362 0.0021 1   
7 Size 100 0.1098 0.7528 0.5396 0.1113 0.8631 -0.0019 1 
 
Consideration should be given to the high correlation between the control variables, 
which increase the chances of multicolinearity problems. Nevertheless, the large pool 
of observations limits this probability fairly well. 
4.2. Difference-in-difference analysis 
Table 5 shows the results obtained from the analysis. In the three columns we can see 
the impact that each variable has on firms' return on assets. While in Column (1) the 
analysis is restricted to the use of the main independent variables, in Column (2) I 
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control for firm R&D expenditure and number of employees. The reason for the WARN 
Act not being significant in Column (1) might be determined by the fact that I am 
omitting important variables in the regression, which changes in Column (2) when I 
introduce the control variables. 
In Column (2) the coefficient of the WARN Act, 0.0412(±0.0155), meaning that after 
the WARN, the ROA increases by 4.12 percentage point for the treatment group of 
firms. So if the original ROA is 1% it becomes 5.12%, if it is 2% becomes 6.12% and so 
on. These results suggest that the passage of the WARN Act had a significant and 
positive impact on firm profitability. 
In Column (3) I introduced a variable to see whether the effect of WARN changes for 
firms that invest more in R&D. The coefficient 0.0749(±0.0136) implies the ROA 
increases by 7.49 percentage point for these firms, implying that the positive effect of 
the WARN Act on firms' profitability was even more significant in companies with more 
R&D investment. Overall, these results suggest that the effect of the change in 
dismissal laws is good only for firms that invest in R&D. 
Table 5. Difference-in-differences: Return on assets 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES roa roa roa 
    
(Post1989)*(Size100) 0.0144 0.0412*** -0.0363** 
 (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0181) 
(Post1989)*(Size100)*(logxrd)   0.0749*** 
   (0.0136) 
Post 1989 -0.131*** -0.0922*** -0.0707*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0237) (0.0240) 
Size 100 0.0666*** -0.0282* -0.0298* 
 (0.0124) (0.0153) (0.0154) 
R&D Expend. (log)  -0.252*** -0.294*** 
  (0.0243) (0.0284) 
Number of Employees (log)  3.042*** 3.112*** 
  (0.336) (0.340) 
Constant -0.0487** -0.149*** -0.139*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0289) (0.0286) 
    
Observations 11,471 11,471 11,471 
R-squared 0.026 0.072 0.078 
Number of firms 3,348 3,348 3,348 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.3. Robustness check 
The differences-in-differences analysis raises some concerns, in that having a large 
sample can provide minor effects with statistical significance. In order to address this 
problem, I replicated the analysis using a shorter period of time, limiting the analysis to 
the years between 1985 and 1995. This reduced the number of observations and 
consequentially the likelihood of minor effects being significant. 
This also builds on the previous argument that the WARN Act is exogenous. Restricting 
the time period even more, it becomes even less likely that firms are reacting to the 
law change in such a short amount of time by endogenously changing the number of 
employees. 
The results are presented in Table 6. While in Column (2) the analysis loses significance 
without any great difference between firms' R&D expenditure, Column (3) shows that 
the impact of the WARN Act on ROA remains significant, with a slight increase in 
coefficient value, 0.0764(±0.0185) and -0.0433(±0.0197), both for firms that invest in 
R&D and those that do not. These findings are consistent with the results in Table 5. 
Table 6. Robustness Check: Between 1985 and 1995 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES roa roa Roa 
    
(Post1989)*(Size100) 0.000877 0.0199 -0.0433** 
 (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0197) 
(Post1989)*(Size100)*(logxrd)   0.0764*** 
   (0.0185) 
Post 1989 -0.0708*** -0.0269 -0.0194 
 (0.0248) (0.0233) (0.0231) 
Size 100 0.0462*** -0.0325* -0.0327* 
 (0.0136) (0.0169) (0.0169) 
R&D Expend. (log)  -0.246*** -0.293*** 
  (0.0265) (0.0311) 
Number of Employees (log)  2.848*** 2.895*** 
  (0.369) (0.368) 
Constant -0.0930*** -0.169*** -0.147*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0285) (0.0287) 
    
Observations 5,871 5,871 5,871 
R-squared 0.014 0.076 0.084 
Number of firm 1,985 1,985 1,985 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This work provides empirical evidence that government regulation of employee 
dismissal is a causal determinant in firms' profitability, by fostering innovation. Using 
firms' return on assets as a measure for profitability, and exploiting the enhanced 
dismissal strictness imposed by the 1989 WARN Act, I found that the increased hurdles 
that employers are faced with when terminating with employee contracts actually 
boosted the profitability of companies in the U.S. that are investing in innovation. 
There are limitations to this study that are also worth noting. Essentially, restricting 
the sample to public companies may result in unobserved effects on private 
companies, for which additional research is necessary. Since profitability may come 
from the firms' increased willingness to invest in risky R&D projects, this effect can be 
particularly accentuated given that the ownership structure of a firm may directly 
influence its corporate risk taking (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; May, 1995). Therefore, 
the fact that this study only focuses on public companies prevents us from assessing 
the overall impact of dismissal law on economic performance. 
Another important issue is related to the difference-in-difference tests. The analysis 
was conducted by comparison over a stipulated critical mass (i.e. over 100 employees). 
Therefore, laws or policy changes that may influence profitability, could affect the 
results if they resemble WARN in discrimination based on the size of the workforce. 
Lastly, the results of this study are consistent with the findings by Acharya et al. 
(2012a) that exploited the same effect in U.S. legislation to show that stricter dismissal 
laws have a positive effect on innovation. By contrast, the findings in this study confute 
a large stream of literature arguing that dismissal law harm company profits (e.g. 
Botero et al., 2004; Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Besley and Burgess, 2004). 
The findings in this analysis help shed some light on the positive effects of dismissal 
laws and, in a larger context, labor market regulation. Assessing the aggregate welfare 
implications of labor laws, not only for companies, but also for the society as a whole, 
is an important topic for future research. 
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